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INTRODUCTION 
Respondents Stouffer Foods, Inc. and The Travelers 
Insurance Company (collectively "Stouffer") hereby submit their 
response to Petitioner Reva Brunson's ("Brunson") Petition for 
Review of an Order of the Industrial Commission of Utah 
("Commission") denying Brunson's claim for Workers' Compensation 
benefits. The Commission concluded that Brunson had not met the 
requisite burden of proving her employment with Stouffer was the 
medical cause of her injury, and thus denied her claim. The 
Commission thereby affirmed the findings of fact and conclusions 
of law entered by the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") on the 
case. 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over Brunson's Petition for 
Review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 35-1-82.53, -86 (1994), § 
63-46b-16 (1993), and § 78-2a-3(2)(a) (Supp. 1994) and Rule 14 of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Stouffer submits that the issue on appeal and the 
governing standard of review are as follows: 
Issue: Whether the Commission erred in holding that 
Brunson failed to meet the medical causation aspect of her burden 
of proving her injury arose out of and in the course of her 
employment at Stouffer. 
Standard of Review: The substantial evidence standard 
governs the review of this issue- The Commission found that 
Brunson's work activities were not the medical cause of her 
injury, (R. 64.) "Medical causation . . . is a factual matter." 
Virgin v. Board of Review, 803 P.2d 1284, 1287 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990). As such, the Commission's findings must be affirmed if 
they are "'supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light 
of the whole record before the court.'" Grace Drilling Co. v. 
Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 67 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)(quoting 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g) (1988)(unchanged in current 
version)). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla of 
evidence but less than the weight of the evidence. Id. at 68. 
It is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept 
as adequate to support a conclusion. Id. 
Brunson also states that the substantial evidence 
standard governs the Court's review of the issue raised on 
appeal, but she misapplies the test. In her argument, Brunson 
asserts that the Commission erred by arbitrarily disregarding 
competent evidence, and merely posits that certain evidence 
exists which supports a finding of medical causation. (See Brief 
for Petitioner at 8, 9-10, 13.) As indicated by the statute and 
case law cited above, the issue is not whether evidence exists 
which contravenes the Commission's findings. Instead, the Court 
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must inquire whether the Commission's decision is supported by 
substantial evidence. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS 
Stouffer submits that the following statutes are 
determinative of this appeal: Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-45 (1994) 
and § 63-46b-16 (1993). These statutes are set forth in full at 
Addendum "A." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Brunson seeks review of the Commission's Order 
affirming the Order of the ALJ and denying Brunson's claim for 
Workers' Compensation benefits. The Commission denied Brunson's 
claim for benefits because Brunson did not prove that her work 
activities were the medical cause of her injury. (R. 64.) 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
Brunson filed an Application for Hearing with the 
Commission on February 22, 1994, seeking medical expenses and 
temporary total disability benefits. (R. 1-2.) Brunson therein 
asserted that an injury she suffered in a fall while working at 
Stouffer arose out of her employment. (R. 1.) Stouffer 
responded that there was no causal connection between Brunson's 
fall and her employment, and that she therefore was not entitled 
to workers' compensation benefits. (R. 12.) 
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A hearing before the ALJ was held on August 31, 1994. 
(R. 24.) The ALJ concluded that Brunson's fall and resulting 
injury did not arise out of her employment with Stouffer, and 
accordingly denied workers' compensation benefits. (R. 29.) 
Specifically, the ALJ found that Brunson's employment and related 
activities were not the legal cause or the medical cause of her 
injury. (R. 27.) Brunson filed a Motion for Review with the 
Commission on November 10, 1994. (R. 32-40.) On February 17, 
1995, focusing on the issue of medical causation, the Commission 
denied Brunson's Motion and denied her claim for workers' 
compensation benefits. (R. 109.) 
Statement of Facts 
Brunson's injury occurred on December 7, 1993. (R. 5.) 
At that time, she was approximately seventy-five years old and 
had been employed by Stouffer for three days. (R. 25.) Her job 
involved standing at and monitoring a conveyer belt on the 3:00 
p.m. to 11:00 p.m. shift. (R. 25.) On the night of her injury, 
she was working overtime. At approximately 12:15 a.m., Brunson 
began to feel light headed and suddenly fell over backwards, 
hitting her head on a tile floor. (Id.) She was taken to 
Mountain View Hospital in Payson where she remained for three 
days. (R. 3, 25.) 
At the time of her fall, Brunson had been awake for 
over twenty hours; she had been up since 6:00 a.m. the previous 
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morning. (R. 25.) She had rested before going to work, had 
taken a meal break from approximately 7:30 p.m. to 8:00 p.m., 
(id.), and had also taken several other breaks during the 
evening. (R. 51, 60.) She testified at the hearing before the 
ALJ that she believed her fall was due to the fact that she was 
wearing an additional undershirt, and that the extra clothing had 
caused her to become too warm, or that she had not eaten enough 
carbohydrates. (R. 25-26.) Additionally, she was just getting 
over a bout with bronchitis. (R. 26.) She had also, on at least 
one previous occasion, fainted after getting over a cold. (R. 
170; Brief for Petitioner, Addendum A at 1.) 
One week after Brunson's fall, Dr. Dean Egbert, the 
emergency room physician who had treated her at Mountain View 
Hospital, wrote that, other than becoming lightheaded, "no other 
specific cause of the blacking out episode was found." (R. 46.) 
He added: "Considering the nature of this work, I think that the 
most likely cause of her passing out was motion sickness due to 
watching the conveyer belt go past her." (Id.; Brief for 
Petitioner, Addendum C.) 
After examining Brunson, Dr. Kevin J. Colver, a 
consulting physician, (R. 3), wrote in his consultation report: 
"Syncope. This is probably due to a generalized weakness and 
working too hard on her feet after getting over a bout with 
bronchitis. She may have also had some labyrinthitis with some 
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vertigo which could have been exacerbated by the motion of the 
conveyer belt."1 (R. 46; Brief for Petitioner, Addendum A at 2.) 
In responding to subsequent questions put to him by Brunson, Dr. 
Colver clarified his consulting report by stating, in pertinent 
part: 
I did feel the most likely cause of your 
fainting was, "due to a generalized weakness 
and working too hard on her feet after 
getting over a bout of bronchitis." My 
records indicate that you had a cough from 
which you were recovering when you went back 
to work and had the accident. The sentence 
in Mr. Wahlquists [sic] letter which states, 
"Dr. Kevin Colver reported that your fainting 
was probably due to your getting over a bout 
with bronchitis" is accurate. 
(R. 45; Brief for Petitioner, Addendum B.) 
Brunson's attending physician at Mountain View Hospital 
was Dr. John R. Clark. (R. 3.) Dr. Clark prepared Brunson's 
hospital discharge summary. He there indicated the cause of 
Brunson's fall was "[s]yncope, recurrent." (R. 156.) He also 
prepared the Summary of Medical Record submitted to the 
Commission. In response to a question contained in the Summary 
asking whether there was a "medically demonstrative causal 
relationship between the industrial accident and the problems you 
Syncope is defined as "a partial or complete temporary 
suspension of respiration and circulation due to cerebral 
ischemia: FAINT" Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 1197 
(1988). 
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have been treating," Dr. Clark wrote "yes." (R. 5; Brief for 
Petitioner, Addendum D.) 
Another physician, Dr. David T. Roberts, ran an 
electroencephalogram ("EEG") on Brunson, the results of which he 
characterized as "abnormal." (R. 195.) He elaborated that some 
of the measured wave forms "appear[ed] suspiciously epileptiform 
in character." (Id.) There is no indication in his report 
whether he ascribed, or could ascribe, the abnormalities to her 
fall at Stouffer, or its cause. (See R. 195-96.) 
A hearing on Brunson's Application for Adjustment of 
Claim was held on August 31, 1994, before the ALJ. (R. 24.) At 
the hearing, Victoria Nelson, a registered nurse employed by 
Stouffer for seven years, testified that she had seen employees 
working on other conveyer belts made nauseous and light headed by 
the movement of the belts. Most such individuals were pregnant. 
The nurse added that, to her knowledge, no one had become 
nauseous or light headed while working the conveyer belt Brunson 
had been monitoring, which was designed differently. (R. 26.) 
The ALJ found that the preponderance of the evidence 
showed that "Brunson's injury coincidentally occurred at work 
because of her idiopathic condition without any enhancement from 
the workplace." (R. 26.) In his findings of fact, the ALJ 
specifically considered Nurse Nelson's testimony, Dr. Roberts's 
EEG findings, and Dr. Colver's consultation report. (R. 26.) 
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The ALJ concluded that, "[a]1though there has been speculation 
about why she had the fainting episode, there is no evidence 
which has been set forth which meets the standard of a reasonable 
medical probability." (R. 26-27,) Moreover, the ALJ found: 
Prior to and at the time of her syncopal 
episode and fall, Mrs. Brunson was not 
engaged in any activity which created any 
strain, exertion, or stress greater than that 
of her normal nonemployment life or the 
normal nonemployment life of any other 
person. Her syncopal episode and injury did 
not result from any strain, exertion, or 
stress related to her employment. 
(R. 27.) Thus, because he found the fall was related to a 
syncopal episode and was not legally or medically caused by her 
employment activities, the ALJ ruled that Brunson's injury did 
not arise out of and in the course of her employment, and thus 
ruled that she was not entitled to workers' compensation 
benefits. (R. 27-29.) 
On November 10, 1994, Brunson filed a Motion for Review 
with the Commission. (R. 40.) She argued that the ALJ ignored 
evidence indicating that "her work activities and conditions had 
aggravated her internal infirmities, causing an accident." (R. 
32.) Stouffer responded that, in fact, the ALJ had considered 
the evidence in the medical record,2 and properly concluded 
2In her Motion for Review, Brunson faulted the ALJ for not 
considering the clarifying letter of Dr. Colver, and the letter 
of Dr. Egbert, both quoted above. (R. 35-36.) However, in its 
Reply Memorandum, Stouffer pointed out that Brunson had not made 
these letters a part of the medical record that was before the 
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therefrom that Brunson had not satisfied her burden of 
demonstrating that her injury was caused by her employment 
activities. (R. 49-53.) 
In its Order Denying Motion for Review dated February 
17, 1995, the Commission affirmed the ALJ's decision, and 
dismissed Brunson7s Motion for Review. (R. 64.) In its findings 
of fact, the Commission adopted and summarized the findings of 
fact set forth by the ALJ. (R. 63.) The Commission specifically 
considered the written statements of Drs. Egbert, Colver, and 
Clark quoted above. Commenting on the evidence before it, the 
Commission stated that "Brunson can only speculate as to the 
cause of her fainting spell." (Id.) It observed that the 
doctors' "conjectures" were inconsistent and did not establish 
causation with reasonable medical certainty. (R. 64.) Under the 
circumstances, the Commission ruled that Brunson had failed to 
ALJ, notwithstanding that Brunson had the medical record for six 
weeks before the hearing date, which was once postponed, and thus 
had ample time to review and supplement it. (R. 48.) At no time 
did Brunson indicate there were any records missing from the 
medical record. Under these circumstances, Stouffer argued it 
was improper for Brunson to then supplement the record, and that 
the Commission should not consider the new records. (Id.) See, 
e.g., Workers' Compensation Fund v. Industrial Comm'n, 761 P.2d 
572, 575 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)("Unless such evidence is brought 
into the case, and in some lawful manner made a part of the 
record, it cannot be regarded as competent evidence, and must be 
excluded in determining the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support the findings of the Industrial Commission."). Moreover, 
Stouffer argued, the two letters at issue did not demonstrate the 
causation that the ALJ had ruled was lacking. (R. 49-50). In 
any event, the Commission considered these letters in rendering 
its opinion (See R. 63-64.) 
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meet her burden of proving medical causation, and thus denied her 
claim for workers' compensation benefits. (Id.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
On appeal to this Court, Brunson seeks to reverse the 
Commission's decision, arguing that the Commission ignored 
evidence in reaching its conclusion that Brunson failed to 
establish that her employment activities were the medical cause 
of her accident. (Brief for Petitioner at 9.) Brunson's 
argument fails for several reasons. 
First, Brunson has failed to properly raise the issue. 
Medical causation is a factual issue, and the relevant standard 
of review is the substantial evidence standard. Under this 
measure, a petitioner must marshal all of the evidence in favor 
of the Commission's decision and demonstrate why it does not 
support the Commission's conclusion. Brunson has not marshaled 
the evidence in accord with this requirement and thus her appeal 
should be dismissed. 
Second, an examination of the merits demonstrates that 
the Commission's conclusion is indeed supported by substantial 
evidence when viewed in light of the entire record. The evidence 
in the record Brunson claims supports a finding of medical 
causation is speculative, conjectural, and inconsistent. 
Moreover, contrary to Brunson's contention, the Commission did 
not ignore any of the evidence before it. It considered all of 
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the evidence Brunson set forth, including the statements of Drs. 
Egbert, Colver, and Clark, but simply reached a different 
conclusion therefrom than the one Brunson advanced. It is the 
Commission's duty and prerogative to weigh the factual evidence 
before it and give the evidence such weight as it deems 
appropriate. Simply because a reviewing court might reach a 
different conclusion than that reached by the Commission is not 
grounds for reversal, as long as the Commission's conclusion is 
supported by substantial evidence. In light of the inconclusive 
and inconsistent evidence in the record on the issue of medical 
causation, the Commission's finding is supported.by substantial 
evidence, and thus this Court should affirm it. 
Third, regardless of the result as to medical 
causation, Brunson's appeal must still fail because she has 
failed to properly raise the issue of legal causation on appeal. 
In order to receive workers' compensation benefits, a claimant 
must establish that her employment activities were both the 
medical and the legal cause of an injury. The ALJ ruled Brunson 
had not demonstrated medical or legal causation. The Commission 
affirmed without reaching the question of legal causation because 
it found that Brunson did not prove medical causation. In her 
brief to this Court, Brunson focuses almost exclusively on 
medical, rather than legal causation. Her few, perfunctory 
comments on the latter issue do not suffice to perfect an appeal 
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on that issue. Therefore, the ruling below on the issue of legal 
causation must stand, and Brunson's appeal should be dismissed, 
ARGUMENT 
I. BRUNSON HAS FAILED TO PROPERLY CHALLENGE 
THE COMMISSION'S ORDER DENYING HER 
MOTION FOR REVIEW AND THUS HER APPEAL OF 
THAT ORDER SHOULD BE DISMISSED 
Brunson has failed to properly challenge the 
Commission's decision in two respects: first, she has failed to 
marshal the evidence in support of the Commission's decision, 
which she is required to do when challenging a factual finding of 
the Commission; and second, she has failed to provide transcripts 
of the hearing before the ALJ and the Commission, which she is 
also required to do when challenging a factual finding of the 
Commission. This Court has previously held that such 
deficiencies require that the Court treat the Commission's 
findings of fact as conclusive. Brunson is therefore prohibited 
from challenging the Commission's factual findings and, 
accordingly, her appeal should be dismissed. 
As indicated in the Statement of Facts section above, 
the focus of Brunson's appeal is on the medical causation aspect 
of her workers' compensation claim. The issue of medical 
causation is a question of fact, to be resolved by the 
Commission. Virgin v. Board of Review, 803 P.2d 1284, 1287 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990). On appeal, the Commission's decisions on issues 
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of fact are reviewed under the substantial evidence standard. 
Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review. 776 P.2d 63, 67 (Utah Ct. 
App. 19 89). In applying this standard, this Court has repeatedly 
emphasized that a party challenging the Commission's findings of 
fact "must marshal1 all of the evidence supporting the findings 
and show that despite the supporting facts, and in light of the 
conflicting or contradictory evidence, the findings are not 
supported by substantial evidence." Id. at 68; Johnson v. Board 
of Review, 842 P.2d 910, 912 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Stewart v. 
Board of Review, 831 P.2d 134, 137-38 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); 
Virgin v. Board of Review, 803 P.2d 1284, 1287 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990) . 
Where a party fails to marshal the evidence in support 
of the Commission's findings and then demonstrate that those 
findings are unsupported by substantial evidence, this Court 
"accept [s] the Commission's findings as conclusive." Merriam v. 
Board of Review, 812 P.2d 447, 450 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Johnson, 
842 P.2d at 912; Stewart, 831 P.2d at 138. Accordingly, in 
Merriam, this Court held that if a party fails to "marshal," and 
the Commission has entered a finding of no medical causation, the 
Court should accept the Commission's finding as conclusive and 
affirm the Commission's denial of workers' compensation benefits 
812 P,2d at 450-51. 
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Brunson has made no attempt in her brief to marshal the 
evidence so as to satisfy the burden imposed by the substantial 
evidence standard of review. Her challenge to the Commission's 
decision consists essentially of an argument that it erred in 
finding no medical causation because certain evidence in the 
record purportedly indicates otherwise. (Brief for Petitioner at 
8, 9-12.) Arguing that evidence exists that may undercut the 
Commission's decision is insufficient to meet her marshalling 
burden. Instead, Brunson is required to marshal all of the 
evidence supporting the Commission's decision, and then, in light 
of the record as a whole, demonstrate why the Commission's 
finding of no medical causation is unsupported by the evidence. 
See, e.g., Horton v. Gem State Mut. of Utah, 794 P.2d 847, 849 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990)("[Petitioner] . . . failed to meet its 
obligation to marshal the evidence by persistently arguing its 
own position without regard for the evidence supporting the trial 
court's findings, and failing to demonstrate that the findings 
were against the [weight of the relevant standard of review].11); 
Christensen v. Munns. 812 P.2d 69, 73 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)("When 
appellant attacks the evidence, we begin our analysis with the 
trial court's findings of fact, not with an appellant's view of 
the way the trial court should have found."). Brunson has failed 
to comply with this requirement. Thus, this Court should adopt 
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the Commission's finding of no medical causation as conclusive, 
and accordingly should affirm the Commission's decision. 
Brunson's appeal should also be dismissed because she 
has failed to provide a transcript of relevant portions of the 
hearing before the ALJ. The Utah Administrative Procedures Act, 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-1 (1993 & Supp. 1994), provides that the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure govern this Court's review of 
agency actions. Id. § 63-46b-16(2)(b) (1993); King v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 850 P.2d 1281, 1285 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Rule 11(e)(2) 
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure in turn provides: "If the 
appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding or conclusion 
is unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence, the appellant 
shall include in the record a transcript of all evidence relevant 
to such finding or conclusion." Utah R. Appellate P. 11(e)(2);3 
see also King, 850 P.2d at 1285 ("Rule 11 requires counsel 
provide the appellate court with all evidence pertinent to the 
issues on appeal. Thus, our procedural rules specifically 
require a petitioner to provide a transcript of the proceedings 
if he is going to challenge factual findings under subsection 63-
46b-16(4)(g)." (citations omitted)). 
3The rule continues: "Neither the court nor the appellee is 
obligated to correct appellant's deficiencies in providing the 
relevant portions of the transcript." Utah R. Appellate P. 
11(e)(2). 
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As noted above, Brunson is challenging the Commission's 
findings on the medical causation issue — an issue of fact. Some 
of the evidence supporting the Commission's finding of no medical 
causation was adduced at the hearing before the ALJ. (See, e.g., 
R. 26 (according to nurse's testimony at hearing before ALJ, no 
one had had fainting problems on the conveyer line where Brunson 
worked).) Accordingly, under Rule 11(e)(2), Brunson was 
specifically obligated to include a transcript of portions of 
evidence heard by the ALJ, King, 850 P.2d at 1285, but failed to 
do so. The Court therefore does not have a complete record 
before it and should presume that the Commission's decision was 
supported by competent and sufficient evidence. Horton, 794 P.2d 
at 849; Sampson v. Richins, 770 P.2d 998, 1002 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989) .4 In this case, such a presumption voids Brunson's 
argument that the Commission erred in finding no medical 
4Sampson states that where a transcript has not been 
submitted on appeal, and the court thus does not have a complete 
record before it, which creates the presumption that a lower 
court's findings are supported by competent and sufficient 
evidence, ,,xthe findings must [nevertheless] themselves be 
sufficient to provide a sound foundation for the judgment, and 
conversely . . . any proper judgment can only be entered in 
accordance with the findings.'" 770 P.2d at 1002 (quoting 
Forbush v. Forbush, 578 P.2d 518, 519 (Utah 1978)). Here, the 
Commission's finding of no medical causation, which must be 
presumed under Sampson, supports the Commission's ultimate denial 
of workers' compensation benefits because medical causation is a 
prerequisite to an award of benefits under the workers' 
compensation system. Allen v. Industrial Comm'n, 729 P.2d 15, 
25, 27 (Utah 1986). 
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causation. Accordingly, this Court should affirm the 
Commission's decision. 
II. THE COMMISSION'S ORDER DENYING BRUNSON'S MOTION 
FOR REVIEW SHOULD BE AFFIRMED BECAUSE IT IS 
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, AND THUS HER 
APPEAL OF THE COMMISSION'S ORDER SHOULD BE 
DISMISSED 
The record before the Court demonstrates that the 
Commission's finding of no medical causation is supported by 
substantial evidence. The evidence simply does not prove that 
Brunson's employment activities were the medical cause of her 
injury. The Commission did, in fact, consider the evidence in 
the record, and specifically evaluated the statements of 
Brunson's doctors which she contends were ignored. The 
Commission judged them to be of little consequence and thus, 
within its discretion, properly gave them little weight and 
rejected Brunson's contention that her employment was the medical 
cause of her injury. Because the Commission's factual finding of 
no medical causation is supported by substantial evidence, the 
Court should affirm the Commission's decision and dismiss 
Brunson's appeal. 
To recover workers' compensation benefits, a claimant 
must demonstrate both legal and medical causation. Allen, 729 
P.2d at 25; Willardson v. Industrial Comm'n. 856 P.2d 371, 374-75 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993). Brunson has appealed the Commission's 
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decision on the latter causation issue, (See Brief for Petitioner 
at 9-13), which was the focus of the Commission's opinion, (R. 
64). The purpose of the medical causation test is "to ensure 
that there is a medically demonstrable causal link between the 
work-related exertions and the unexpected injuries that resulted 
from those strains" and to "prevent an employer from becoming a 
general insurer of his employees and discourage fraudulent 
claims." Allen, 729 P.2d at 27. Therefore, if a claimant cannot 
show a medical causal connection between the claimant's 
employment and claimed injury, compensation must be denied. Id. 
at 27. 
To satisfy the medical causation requirement, a 
claimant must show "that the stress, strain, or exertion required 
by his or her occupation led to the resulting injury or 
disability." Id. The claimant must make this showing by a 
preponderance of the evidence. Virgin, 803 P.2d at 12 88; Large 
v. Industrial Comm'n, 758 P.2d 954, 956 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). As 
demonstrated below, in light of the entire record Brunson has not 
sufficiently demonstrated that her employment activities led to 
her injury. 
In her brief before the Court, Brunson contends the 
Commission ignored the statements of Drs. Colver, Egbert, and 
Clark, as well as the testimony of Nurse Nelson. Ironically, the 
Commission did consider each of the statements advanced by 
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Brunson, and concluded the statements were speculative and 
inconsistent as to medical causation. (R. 63.) 
For example, Brunson argues Dr. Colver's statement 
establishes medical causation. However, his words establish 
little. He wrote: "Syncope. This is probably due to a 
generalized weakness and working too hard on her feet after 
getting over a bout with bronchitis. She may have also had some 
labyrinthitis with some vertigo which could have been exacerbated 
by the motion of the conveyer belt." (R. 46 (emphasis added); 
Brief for Petitioner, Addendum A at 2 (emphasis added).) Even in 
ostensibly clarifying his opinion, Dr. Colver could muster no 
more definite opinion than to reiterate: 
the most likely cause of your fainting was, 
"due to a generalized weakness and working 
too hard on her feet after getting over a 
bout of bronchitis." My records indicate 
that you had a cough from which you were 
recovering when you went back to work and had 
the accident. The sentence in Mr. Wahlquists 
[sic] letter which states, "Dr. Kevin Colver 
reported that your fainting was probably due 
to your getting over a bout with bronchitis" 
is accurate. 
(R. 45 (emphasis added); Brief for Petitioner, Addendum B 
(emphasis added).) Dr. Egbert's statement is as flaccid: 
"Considering the nature of this work, I think that the most 
likely cause of her passing out was motion sickness due to 
watching the conveyer belt go past her." (R. 46 (emphasis 
added); Brief for Petitioner, Addendum C (emphasis added).) 
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Neither of these statements suffices to establish 
medical causation. The purported opinions are stated in terms of 
likelihood and probability, and in terms of "may" and "could." 
The Utah Supreme Court has previously indicated that such 
equivocal terms are indicia of uncertainty and not of sufficient 
medical certainty to satisfy the medical causation requirement.5 
See, e.g., Lancaster v. Gilbert Dev., 736 P.2d 237, 239-41 (Utah 
1987)(holding medical opinions using terms "probably" and 
"likely" were not statements of medical certainty sufficient to 
demonstrate claimant's injury was caused by work related 
factors). 
Brunson also relies on the purported opinion of Dr. 
Clark. Dr. Clark's statement, however, is not what Brunson 
believes it to be. Dr. Clark prepared the Summary of Medical 
Record submitted to the Commission. In response to a question 
contained in the Summary asking whether there was a "medically 
demonstrative causal relationship between the industrial accident 
and the problems you have been treating," Dr. Clark wrote "yes." 
(R. 5; Brief for Petitioner, Addendum D.) Again, at best for 
5Brunson cites to an American Medical Association guidebook 
for definitions of the terms possibility and probability. It 
defines the former as less than a 50% chance and the latter as 
signifying a greater than 50% chance. Ironically, neither the 
statements of Dr. Colver, nor the statement of Dr. Egbert, use 
these terms. Moreover, the guidebook states that the two terms 
are only "sometimes used" to connote these meanings. (Brief for 
Petitioner at 11-12.) Thus, the guidebook is of little value. 
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Brunson, this statement affords inconclusive support. Although 
it speaks in terms of medical causation, on its face it indicates 
nothing more than that the accident, or in other words Brunson's 
fall to the floor, caused the injuries he treated. It does not 
ask whether Brunson's employment caused the injury, or even 
whether Brunson's employment caused the fall which in turn 
resulted in the injury. It merely asks whether her fall resulted 
in the injury treated — his affirmative answer thus does not 
assist Brunson in making her proof of medical causation. Cf. 
Helf v. Industrial Comm'n, 271 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 4 & n.3 (Utah 
Ct. App. August 24, 1995)(characterizing doctor's conclusion that 
patient's injury was work related merely because it was suffered 
while patient was performing duties at work as "not particularly 
helpful to determine medical causation" because there was no 
support to show the injury arose from patient's employment 
activities). Dr. Clark's direct statement as to the cause of 
Brunson's injury has no employment connection: "Syncope, 
recurrent." (R. 156.) 
Lastly, Nurse Nelson's testimony also does not assist 
Brunson's claim. She testified before the ALJ that in her seven 
years of experience with Stouffer, she had seen employees working 
other conveyer belts made nauseous and light headed by the 
movement of the belts. (R. 26.) However, she added that most 
such individuals were pregnant and that, to her knowledge, no one 
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had become nauseous or light headed while working the conveyer 
belt Brunson had been monitoring, which had been designed 
differently. (Id.) Thus, her testimony similarly does not 
establish the requisite medical causation. 
Not only do these statements fail to establish that 
Brunson was injured as a result of her employment activities, 
there is other evidence in the record that affirmatively suggests 
her employment activities at Stouffer were not the cause of her 
injury. For example, at the time of her fall, Brunson had been 
awake for over twenty hours; she had been up since 6:00 a.m. the 
previous morning. She claimed she had eaten too few 
carbohydrates and was wearing extra clothing (an extra 
undershirt) which caused her to become too warm. (R. 25-26.) 
She was just getting over a bout with bronchitis, (R. 26), and 
had on at least one previous occasion fainted after getting over 
a cold, (R. 170; Brief for Petitioner, Addendum A at 1). 
Additionally, the post-fall EEG revealed abnormal results — some 
of the measured wave forms appeared suspiciously epileptiform in 
character. (R. 195.) However, there is no indication in the EEG 
report whether the doctor ascribed, or could ascribe, the 
abnormalities to Brunson's fall at Stouffer or to the cause of 
the fall. 
The opinions of the doctors on which Brunson relies 
also provide affirmative support for the Commission's finding of 
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no medical causation. For example, Dr. Clark identified the 
cause of Brunson's fall as "[sjyncope, recurrent." (R. 156.) 
This statement, particularly in light of her previous fainting 
episode, indicates that the problem is a recurring one, which 
suggests Brunson's injury was not caused by her work activities. 
Also, in his clarifying letter, Dr. Colver attributed Brunson's 
fainting to her getting over a bout with bronchitis. (R. 45; 
Brief for Petitioner, Addendum B.) Thus, Brunson's doctors 
provide support for the Commission's conclusion that her injury 
was not caused by her employment activities. 
Even to the extent the testimony of Drs. Colver, 
Egbert, and Clark, as well as that of Nurse Nelson, may be 
construed to lend some support to Brunson's claim of medical 
causation, the additional evidence set forth above provides 
nonemployment-related causation theories. The Commission is 
charged with finding facts, drawing inferences therefrom, and 
resolving conflicting evidence. Under the substantial evidence 
standard of review, this Court has consistently held that it will 
"not substitute its own judgment as between two reasonably 
conflicting views, even though it may have come to a different 
conclusion." Virgin, 803 P.2d at 1287; King, 850 P.2d at 1285; 
Grace Drilling. 776 P.2d at 68. "*It is the province of the 
Board, not appellate courts, to resolve conflicting evidence, and 
where inconsistent inferences can be drawn from the same 
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evidence, it is for the Board to draw the inferences.'" Virgin, 
803 P.2d at 1287 (quoting Grace Drilling, 776 P.2d at 68). In 
light of the entire record before the Court, the Commission's 
conclusion that Brunson had not satisfactorily demonstrated 
medical causation is an appropriate resolution of conflicting 
testimony, particularly where the evidence adduced by Brunson in 
her favor is speculative in nature and inconsistent. See 
Lancaster, 736 P.2d at 240 ("Not one of the doctors was willing 
to state with medical certainty that the claimant's injury was 
caused by work-related factors. Thus, there is competent and 
comprehensive medical evidence in the record upon which the 
administrative law judge could rely in concluding that medical 
causation was lacking."). Accordingly, this Court should affirm 
the Commission's denial of benefits. 
III. BRUNSON HAS NOT CHALLENGED THE 
COMMISSION'S FINDING OF NO LEGAL 
CAUSATION AND THUS HER APPEAL OF THE 
COMMISSION'S ORDER SHOULD BE DISMISSED 
Brunson's appeal must also be dismissed because she has 
not properly challenged the determination below of no legal 
causation, nor has she demonstrated a legally sufficient causal 
link between her employment and her injury. In order to recover 
workers' compensation benefits, a claimant must demonstrate that 
the claimant's employment activities were both the medical and 
legal cause of an injury. Allen. 729 P.2d at 25. Because a 
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claimant is required to prove both legal and medical causation, 
"failure to prove either one precludes recovery," Smallwood v. 
Board of Review, 841 P.2d 716, 719 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). The ALJ 
specifically found that Brunson's employment activities were not 
the legal cause of her injury. Thus, Brunson's failure to 
properly challenge this finding and to show that her employment 
was the legal cause of her injury is fatal to her appeal, because 
regardless of the result on medical causation, she is precluded 
from recovering benefits. 
Brunson has not properly raised the issue of legal 
causation with the Court. It is not expressly raised in the 
Docketing Statement, nor is it adequately briefed to this Court, 
nor was it fully briefed below. The ALJ specifically concluded 
that "[n]either Mrs. Brunson7s employment nor any activities 
related thereto were the legal cause or medical cause of her 
injury." (R. 27.) In her Motion for Review to the Commission, 
Brunson included only one substantive heading. It is styled "THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE IGNORED COMPETENT, RELIABLE AND CREDIBLE 
EVIDENCE WHEN HE FOUND THAT THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE WHICH MEETS THE 
STANDARD OF REASONABLE MEDICAL PROBABILITY AS TO AN INDUSTRIAL 
CAUSE OF THE APPLICANT'S ACCIDENT." (R. 37.) Her argument in 
the Motion for Review went to that point.6 This is confirmed by 
6In the final paragraph of the Motion, Brunson asserted that 
she is entitled to workers1 compensation benefits if her 
preexisting condition is aggravated by her employment activities. 
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the Commission's Order, which observed that "the focus of this 
case is on the requirement of medical causation." (R. 64.) In 
the end, the Commission found that Brunson had failed to prove 
medical causation and on that basis denied her claim for 
benefits. (Id.) The Commission did not explicitly reach the 
issue of legal causation, but it adopted the findings of fact of 
the ALJ and affirmed his decision. (R. 63-64.) 
In her Docketing Statement, Brunson stated that the 
issue for review was "WHETHER THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERRED BY 
IGNORING COMPETENT, RELIABLE AND CREDIBLE EVIDENCE OF THE 
INDUSTRIAL CAUSE OF APPLICANT'S ACCIDENT AND BY FINDING NO 
INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT OCCURRED." (R. 77.) Although Brunson's use 
of the term "industrial cause" is vague, it should not be 
(R. 39-40.) In one sentence therein, she stated that standing at 
the conveyer belt for periods of time is not an activity engaged 
in by people in everyday, nonindustrial life. (R. 40.) This 
does not suffice to raise the issue of legal causation. First, 
in cases such as this that involve preexisting conditions, (see 
infra note 7), the medical causation test necessarily inquires 
whether the injury was caused by a work-related activity rather 
than the preexisting conclusion. See Willardson. 856 P.2d at 
375; Virgin, 803 P.2d at 1287-88. Otherwise, one could not make 
the requisite showing that the employment was the medical cause 
of the injury. Thus, discussion of preexisting condition in the 
medical causation context makes sense. Brunson made her 
aggravation argument to support her argument on medical 
causation; she nowhere indicated that she was challenging legal 
causation. Even if her argument concerning preexisting 
conditions could be construed to raise the legal causation issue, 
her perfunctory treatment of the issue is insufficient for this 
Court to consider it on appeal. Utah R. Appellate P. 24(a)(9); 
S e w v. Security Title Co., 857 P.2d 958, 961 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993); State v. Yates, 834 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
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stretched here to include both the medical and legal prongs of 
the causation test, because her statement of facts relevant to 
her appeal go only to the Commission's failure to find medical 
causation. (See R. 80-83.) Nowhere does she discuss facts 
relevant to the issue of legal causation. 
The statement of issue in Brunson's brief before this 
Court is similarly stated. In her section entitled "Detail of 
Argument," however, she narrows the argument before the Court to 
one of medical causation by stating in the only caption 
thereunder: "THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION IGNORED COMPETENT, 
RELIABLE AND CREDIBLE EVIDENCE WHEN IT FOUND THAT THERE WAS NO 
EVIDENCE WHICH MEETS THE STANDARD OF REASONABLE MEDICAL 
PROBABILITY AS TO AN INDUSTRIAL CAUSE OF THE APPLICANT'S 
ACCIDENT." (Brief for Petitioner at 9 (emphasis added).) 
Although she includes a brief discussion of her preexisting 
condition in her argument section, and two sentences of comments 
on the exertions of an ordinary person in everyday, nonindustrial 
life, (id. at 12-13), it is done in the context of her medical 
causation argument, (see supra note 6 (discussing necessity of 
treating preexisting condition issue in medical causation 
context)), and is supported, she claims, by the medical 
observations of Brunson by Drs. Colver and Egbert. There is no 
discussion of the legal causation element. Accordingly, she has 
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not adequately raised the legal causation issue on appeal to this 
Court. 
Additionally, Brunson's cursory treatment of legal 
causation fails to adequately bring the matter before this Court. 
(See supra note 6 (discussing and defining requirement of 
adequate briefing to appellate court).) Brunson has not 
expressly raised the issue in the Docketing Statement, nor has 
she adequately briefed the issue below or to this Court. 
Therefore, Brunson cannot attack the ALJ's finding of no legal 
causation. Because it is necessary to make out both medical and 
legal causation to collect workers' compensation benefits, and 
the finding of no legal causation is uncontested, Brunson is not 
entitled to collect such benefits and her appeal must fail. 
Finally, Brunson has still not demonstrated that her 
employment activities were the legal cause of her injury. 
Brunson's employment involved standing, with several breaks 
during her shift, at a conveyer belt. Under Allen, "[t]o meet 
the legal causation requirement, a claimant with a preexisting 
condition7 must show that the employment contributed something 
7Brunson admits that at the time of her syncopal episode, 
she was suffering from a preexisting condition. (Brief for 
Petitioner at 12-13.) She was recovering from "a cough without 
fever, chills, sweats and a sore throat," (id. at 4-5.), "and 
consequently, may have been in a weakened state," (id. at 13). 
Additionally, she previously had fainted after getting over a 
cold, (R. 170; Brief for Petitioner, Addendum A at 1), and Dr. 
Clark diagnosed her problem as "[s]yncope, recurrent," (R. 156). 
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substantial to increase the risk he already faced in everyday 
life because of his condition." 729 P.2d at 25. This additional 
element of risk in the workplace is satisfied by an unusual or 
extraordinary exertion, greater than that undertaken in normal, 
everyday life. Id. at 25-26. The extra exertion is required "to 
offset the preexisting condition of the employee as a likely 
cause of the injury, thereby eliminating claims for impairments 
resulting from a personal risk rather than exertions at work." 
Id. at 25. 
To determine whether an activity is greater than that 
undertaken in normal everyday life, the Utah Supreme Court has 
adopted an objective standard. Id. at 26-27. It looks "not [to] 
what [the] particular claimant is accustomed to doing," but to 
"what typical nonemployment activities are generally expected of 
people in today's society." Id. at 26; see also City of 
Tuscaloosa v. Howard, 318 So.2d 729, 732 (Ala. Civ. App. 
1975)(the employment risk must be a "danger or risk materially in 
excess of that to which people not so employed are exposed."); 1A 
Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation 
§ 38.83(b), at 7-320 to -321 (1995) ("Note that the comparison is 
not with this employee's usual exertion in his employment but 
with the exertions of normal nonemployment life of this or any 
other person.") 
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Brunson's standing and walking on her feet during her 
shift, with breaks, is not an activity materially in excess of 
the activities expected of an average person in our society. 
Being on one's feet for extended periods is a basic, virtually 
essential feature of modern life. Standing at work is no 
different than spending a day shopping at the mall, doing the 
week's grocery shopping, or caring for and cleaning a home, all 
of which require lengthy periods of standing. By including 
standing on one's feet under the rubric of "extraordinary 
exertion," Brunson would have this Court define the requirement 
out of existence. If something so elemental to human function 
could qualify as an unusual or extraordinary exertion, little 
could subsequently be excluded from meeting the condition the 
Supreme Court has mandated as a prerequisite to obtaining 
recovery in the context of a preexisting condition. As a result, 
employers would become responsible for aggravations of 
preexisting conditions that are as likely to happen in 
nonemployment activity as at work, but which through happenstance 
occur at the workplace — a result contrary to the Supreme Court's 
stated policy. See Allen, 729 P.2d at 25. Thus, this Court 
should reject Brunson's argument that her activities at Stouffer 
were extraordinary and unusual compared to those undertaken by a 
person in today's society, and dismiss her appeal. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Stouffer respectfully 
requests that this Court deny Brunson's Petition for Review and 
affirm the Order of the Industrial Commission. The Commission's 
decision denying Brunson workers' compensation benefits is 
supported by substantial evidence. Brunson has not shown 
otherwise. Not only has she failed to properly put the 
Commission's decision at issue — b y neglecting to marshal the 
evidence in support of the decision and by failing to provide a 
transcript of facts at issue developed before the ALJ to enable 
an adequate review of the record — but the evidence in the record 
does not establish that her employment activities were the 
medical and legal cause of her injury. Failure to satisfy either 
one of these aspects of causation is fatal to a workers' 
compensation claim in Utah. Here, Brunson has failed to satisfy 
both. The purported medical opinions are inconsistent and 
speculative and thus do not establish medical causation with any 
degree of medical certainty. To the contrary, they contain 
substantial evidence refuting Brunson's claim of medical 
causation. Moreover, Brunson has not properly raised and briefed 
the issue of legal causation. She also has not demonstrated a 
legally sufficient causal link between her employment and her 
injury because her employment activities were not outside the 
typical, nonemployment activities of the average person. Thus, 
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Brunson has not only failed to carry her burdens, she has refused 
to assume them. Accordingly, Stouffer asks this Court to dismiss 
Brunson's appeal and affirm the Commission's Order denying 
Brunson workers' compensation benefits. 
DATED this A day of September, 1995. 
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ADDENDUM 
35-1-45. Compensation for industrial accidents to be 
paid. 
Each employee mentioned in Section 35-1-43 who is injured and the 
dependents of each such employee who is killed, by accident arising out of and 
in the course of his employment, wherever such injury occurred, if the accident 
was not purposely self-inflicted, shall be paid compensation for loss sustained 
on account of the injury or death, and such amount for medical, nurse, and 
hospital services and medicines, and, in case of death, such amount of funeral 
expenses, as provided in this chapter. The responsibility for compensation and 
payment of medical, nursing, and hospital services and medicines, and funeral 
expenses provided under this chapter shall be on the employer and its 
insurance carrier and not on the employee. 
A - l 
63-46b-16- Judicial review — Formal adjudicative pro-
ceedings-
CD As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudica-
tive proceedings. 
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of 
agency action with the appropriate appellate court in the form required 
by the appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court. 
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern 
all additional filings and proceedings in the appellate court. 
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial 
review of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, except that: 
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, sum-
marize, or organize the record; 
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and 
copies for the record: 
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to 
shorten, summarize, or organize the record; or 
(ii) according to any other provision of law. 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's 
record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substan-
tially prejudiced by any of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action 
is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any stat-
ute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-mak-
ing process, or has failed to follow prescribed procedure; 
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a 
decision-making body or were subject to disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or 
implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when 
viewed in light of the whole record before the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justi-
fies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a 
fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
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